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Austria’s agri-biotechnology regulation:  
political consensus despite divergent concepts  
of precaution 
Helge Torgersen and Alexander Bogner 
The invocation of the precautionary principle, 
for instance, to prohibit the commercialisation of 
genetically modified crops in Austria, has been 
criticised for blurring the boundaries between 
science and politics. Three different understand-
ings of precaution arise in the policy process 
around this case, and in the relevant actors’ view 
of precaution and the perceived relationship be-
tween science and politics. The dominant ‘politi-
cal–economic’ understanding has emphasised 
uncertainty about benefits and thus effectively 
reversed the burden of evidence. This was done 
without overtly shifting or challenging the 
boundary between science and politics, though 
their relative priority was reversed. The Austrian 
policy offers a pragmatic means to gain room for 
manoeuvre, rather than a coherent approach for 
a more reflexive way to deal with a controversial 
technology. 
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 MUCH-DISPUTED POLICY TOOL, the 
precautionary principle (PP) has only rarely 
been invoked in an explicit form in official 
policy. In particular, the Austrian Government re-
jected the European Union (EU) regulatory approval 
of three genetically modified (GM) maize varieties. 
Thus, Austria officially spearheaded the application 
of the PP on a national basis as a way to prevent the 
domestic use of GM varieties that already had been 
favourably assessed by other member countries’ 
competent authorities (CAs). This formed part of the 
general Austrian policy on GM crops. As such, it 
can be taken as a case study for widening the scope 
of relevant arguments, resulting in a de facto rever-
sal of the burden of evidence. 
The application of the PP has been associated 
with blurring the boundary between science and pol-
icy from two sides. Scientists and regulators, advo-
cating a ‘sound science’ approach in regulatory 
policy on risk issues, have criticised a politicisation 
of decision-making where only scientific risk argu-
ments should count (Miller and Conko, 2001). On 
the other side, and from a theoretical point of view, 
authors developing the theory of reflexive moderni-
sation regarded a boundary-blurring as an indication 
of a deep scepticism towards science (Beck et al, 
2004). 
After a brief history of GM policy in Austria, its 
application of the PP will be discussed in the light of 
this theory. We will then describe different under-
standings of precaution and their role in three GM-
related policy issues. In the conclusion, we will 
come back to the link drawn between the PP, the 
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Public controversy has been muted since 2000, in 
stark contrast to the years 1996–99. A likely reason 
was that Government policy simply left no room for 
NGO criticism, as it increasingly met every demand 
(apart from banning GMOs entirely). While in the 
public the non-GM option appeared as a matter of 
fact and even actors from industry and science began 
to embrace a non-GM future for Austria, Govern-
ment officials were still divided. Although rarely in 
public, some of them considered GMOs to be 
worthwhile as a future option, if useful products 
were to become available. Similarly, until 2003, of-
ficial farmer representatives would not declare 
themselves either against or for agricultural biotech-
nology; they tried to avoid the issue. They met fewer 
problems by aligning with the popular non-GM posi-
tion of alternative farmers’ associations. Helge Torgersen studied biology at the University of Salz-
burg, then worked as a researcher and lecturer at the Insti-
tute of Molecular Biology and the Institute of Biochemistry,
University of Vienna. Since 1990, he has been a researcher
at the Institute of Technology Assessment (ITA) of the Aus-
trian Academy of Sciences. His main research interests are:
comparative biotechnology policy and safety regulation; risk
assessment of trangenic organisms and public perception of
biotechnology; science studies in biotechnology; and
methods of participatory technology assessment. 
Alexander Bogner is researcher at the Institute of Technol-
ogy Assessment (ITA) of the Austrian Academy of Sciences.
He studied sociology at the University of Salzburg and
Frankfurt am Main. His research interests include science
and technology studies, bioethics and methods of empirical
social research. His books on these topics include Wozu
Experten? Ambivalenzen der Beziehung von Wissenschaft
und Politik (with Helge Torgersen), Grenzpolitik der Exper-
ten and Das Experteninterview. His current project is a
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eversal of the burden of evidence and the question 
f boundary blurring. 
ackground: GM policy in Austria 
ver the mid- to late-1990s, strong non-
overnmental organisation (NGO) campaigning and 
ntense press coverage fuelled a sharp public debate 
n agricultural biotechnology. After some futile at-
empts at regulatory approval, no domestic release of 
 GMO has ever taken place (Mikl and Torgersen, 
996; Torgersen and Seifert, 2000), and no GM crop 
as ever legally grown. In contrast, basic research in 
iotechnology including plant technology saw a 
oost over the same period. Practical risk research, 
owever, did not take off despite official promises in 
arly 2000. 
With risk assessment, the Austrian position has 
lways been that agricultural practices, as a major 
eterminant of environmental impacts, would have 
o be considered as an integral part. The organic 
arming sector in Austria was heavily subsidised, 
omprised a large proportion of farms, and was seen 
s a means to reconcile divergent demands from 
iche-market export strategy to protecting the rural 
tructure, also with an eye to ‘eco-tourism’ (Mikl 
nd Torgersen, 1996; Torgersen and Seifert, 2000). 
Industry and science had to cope with this posi-
ion. Long ago, industry limited its hopes for the 
evelopment of the Austrian biotechnology sector to 
edical applications. Although this corresponded to 
he traditional weakness of the seed sector, the Aus-
rian position was all the more remarkable if we take 
nto account that a right-wing coalition came to power 
n 2000, with expectations of promoting agricul- 
ural biotechnology. However, the official Austrian 
osition did not change significantly: cultivation  
nd marketing of an AgrEvo maize variety contain-
ng a bacterial toxin gene (Bt) was banned in spring 
000. 
PP and reflexive modernisation 
Beyond practical risk politics, the PP is also relevant 
for social theory observing the erosion of traditional 
relationships between science and society. For au-
thors such as Ulrich Beck, precaution has signifi-
cance for a general theory of modernisation. 
Accordingly, the PP indicates that “the assumption 
in favour of the innocence of scientific–technical 
progress increasingly becomes problematic” (Beck 
et al, 2001, page 73 [our translation]). 
In such an understanding, the PP accommodates 
public demands to shift the burden of evidence in 
favour of more comprehensive risk prevention. It 
manifests the increasing scepticism towards science 
and challenges its priority in political decisions on 
risk. Precaution also becomes a lever for novel ideas 
of governance: as the experts’ safety claims are chal-
lenged, claims of uncertainty are taken into account, 
the significance of unintended consequences is ac-
knowledged, and non-scientific rationalities and  
actors from outside science have their say. 
From a very different standpoint, this is close to 
what advocates of a ‘sound science’ approach in regu-
latory policy of risk issues often criticise. Both points 
of view agree in that precaution can be understood as 
blurring boundaries formerly held to be sacrosanct, 
such as the distinction between science and politics 
(or knowledge and values). However, and not surpris-
ingly, they disagree over the interpretation. 
The process of boundaries being transgressed or, 
in a narrower sense, becoming insignificant or ir-
relevant, that is, Entgrenzung (boundary blurring) is 
central to Beck’s modernisation theory. The process 
can be described as signalling the dissolution or plu-
ralisation of categorical distinctions (such as facts and 
values, knowledge and interests, nature and society, 
or life and death) that appeared natural in primary 
(industrial) modernity (Viehöver et al, 2004). 
Boundaries are fundamental because they consti-
tute resources for action, decision-making, and for 
assigning responsibilities (Viehöver, 2005). This is 
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so not only in primary modernity but also in post-
modern societies, in their process of secondary or 
reflexive modernisation. Accordingly, some bounda-
ries are necessary (Beck et al, 2004): to regain the 
capacity to act and to assign responsibility, actors 
must constantly draw new boundaries. 
Boundary-blurring and consequently boundary-
drawing become interesting for the theory of mod-
ernisation because they provide criteria for empirical 
testing (which is not our intention here). A central 
argument is that modernity is reflexive from the 
moment when, as a consequence of scientific and 
technical developments, habitual boundaries and 
patterns of thinking are dissolved by means of risks 
and dangers released by (and in) the process of mod-
ernisation. From this point of view, the experts’ 
boundary work is regarded as a sign of institutional 
dynamics (Bogner, 2005). 
In this perspective, the PP indeed appears empiri-
cally amenable to the theory of reflexive modernisa-
tion in two ways: in contributing to the dissolution 
of boundaries, and in necessitating new boundaries 
under different contextual demands and thus indica-
ting institutional change. However, such change is to 
be considered reflexive only if actors are aware of 
blurring boundaries formerly considered to be self-
evident, and of their own effort to set up new 
boundaries. Hence, for ‘reflexive modernisation’,  
it is important not only how actors deal with the  
dissolution of boundaries but also how they perceive 
their role. 
For that theoretical issue, the Austrian Govern-
ment’s precaution provides a test case by widening 
the scope of arguments considered relevant. Here we 
focus on the boundary between science and politics, 
as this coincides with a frequently raised criticism 
against broadening risk-assessment criteria. 
In this case study, we investigated important ac-
tors’ perception of precaution and of their role 
within a precautionary policy. We are aware that 
perceptions usually do not directly translate into 
politics. Nevertheless, they provide information 
about rationales and help to understand policy 
stances inviting diverging interpretations. We con-
ducted a series of interviews with key experts,  
regulators and NGO representatives. We also  
held three consecutive workshops with Government 
officials and experts involved in formulating the of-
ficial Austrian position (Torgersen and Bogner, 
2004). We asked whose interpretation of the  
PP became relevant, how actors saw the relation-
ship between science and politics, and which  
decision criteria influenced policy, officially and 
unofficially. 
Understandings of precaution 
For the long-standing Austrian policy vis-à-vis GM 
crops, there seems to be a fairly unanimous interpre-
tation among stakeholders, civil servants and scien-
tists. This shared understanding extends to the de 
facto role of the PP as a political tool in routine  
administration. Interviewees from very different 
institutions saw the PP as a political contingency. 
They interpreted the handling of biotechnology,  
and GM maize in particular, as based on political 
considerations yet camouflaged with a scientific ra-
tionale. In such a view, boundaries between science 
and politics indeed seem to blur. 
Actors seemed aware that this position is not only 
difficult to maintain within the European context, 
but also fragile on a domestic level. According to 
important domestic policy actors, Austrian policy 
was unique, marginal, and on the defensive in 
Europe. Even some responsible civil servants criti-
cised a lack of co-ordination and the absence of an 
overall policy concept — strangely, because they 
could have developed one. In their view, politicians 
remain reluctant to deal with the issue, and strong 
forces (public opinion and NGOs) push policy away 
from what conventional science would suggest; so 
the boundary between science and politics, held to 
be ‘natural’, still existed unchallenged. 
While pragmatic interpretations of political prac-
tice were largely overlapping, divergent normative 
views came to the fore when interviewees were 
asked about their interpretation of the PP as such. 
From statements made on different understandings 
of the PP, and taking into account different concep-
tualisations of uncertainty, we constructed three 
main understandings of precaution. These address 
the role of science, politics and public perception, 
and relationships among them. 
Although there were many overlaps, scientists and 
civil servants from the Ministries of Research and of 
Trade tended to espouse a ‘scientific’ understanding. 
Those from the Ministry of Health (the competent 
authority), from the Federal Environment Agency 
(UBA, in charge of assessing proposals) and a mem-
ber of the cabinet of the Minister of Agriculture ar-
gued along the lines of a political–economic 
understanding. NGO representatives and politicians 
from the Social Democrats and the Greens expressed 
views mostly in line with a ‘normative’ systems-
critical understanding. 
We investigated important actors’ 
perception of precaution and of their 
role within a precautionary policy: 
although perceptions usually do not 
directly translate into politics, they 
provide information about rationales 
and help to understand policy stances 
inviting diverging interpretations 
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‘Scientific’ understanding 
Apart from a concession to public anxieties, aiming 
to achieve better acceptance, this understanding of 
the PP implies that uncertainty must be reduced by 
means of new knowledge, preferably through scien-
tific investigation under the (precautionary) hy-
pothesis of possible risk. What the risks are, and 
which consequences would be unacceptable, is  
determined in relation to the ‘state-of-the-art’ of 
modern technology and agriculture. In addition, the 
role of risk arguments in mobilisation campaigns is 
seen to foster public anxieties. 
Dealing with uncertainty, and hence ‘precaution’, 
has always been a constituent of the scientific 
method involving case-to-case analysis and com-
parisons with established knowledge. The question 
of benefit is irrelevant, as extra knowledge already 
constitutes a benefit, or benefit is taken for granted 
within the existing system of exploiting scientific 
research results. 
Hence, applying the PP implies more research, 
performed by those scientific disciplines that fulfil 
the criteria of (natural) science. Ethical aspects only 
play a role at a personal level and hence are scien-
tifically irrelevant. Political decisions are rational, 
provided they are taken primarily on the basis of 
natural scientific insights. It is preferable, but not 
essential, for scientists to make decisions as long as 
they are taken on the basis of science. The boundary 
between science and politics is considered self-
evident and strictly determined, but scientific argu-
ments support specific political choices. 
‘Political–economic’ understanding 
In this understanding, the PP provides guidance in 
cases of decisions under uncertainty. Criteria are not 
only scientific but derive also from the expected dis-
tribution of risks and benefits, or from value judge-
ments. They are therefore predominantly economic 
or ethical in character and need political backing. 
Science necessarily and admittedly produces uncer-
tainty, so there is always residual uncertainty about 
possible risks. While risks from nature must be ac-
cepted, man-made risks can and should be mini-
mised. However, the nature of the respective benefit 
is as important as (if not more important than) risk. 
Therefore, the second main decision criterion is 
uncertainty about benefits. Hence at stake are less 
the health or environmental risks, as the Commis-
sion’s interpretation of the PP might suggest, than 
uncertainty about compatibility with consensual 
socio-economic aims, for example, safeguarding 
small-scale and organic farming. Only uncertainty 
about health and environmental risks are inter-
nationally acknowledged to be relevant, so national 
authorities have to render instrumental the all-
pervasive cognitive uncertainty about such risks as a 
trigger for invoking the PP in practice. Although not 
considered to be in the driving seat, science is still 
seen to be separate from politics. Science delivers 
arguments that can be applied in a political struggle 
but loses its authority if politics interfere with scien-
tific endeavours at finding the truth. 
‘Normative’ systems-critical understanding 
In this case, the PP opens up space for ‘holistic’  
decisions, by taking into account non-quantifiable 
risks and long-term consequences, and by slowing 
down the decision-making process. The criteria for 
decisions derive from the relevant actors’ normative 
orientations. There are two dominant critical orienta-
tions: first, environmental ethics based on a normative 
concept of Nature; and second, a ‘modernisation’-
critical position against increasing economic dispari-
ties and (on a political level) the quasi-technological 
logic of de facto constraints. Here the PP is a kind of 
‘resistance principle’ to be applied to benefit Nature, 
understood as being inherently wise, or to serve the 
protest against the democratic deficit or the monopo-
listic and all-engulfing capitalism in general by pro-
viding scientific arguments. 
A benefit would be anything that promotes the po-
litical aim of a society oriented towards sustainability. 
Potential benefits of biotechnology, even if they could 
be framed according to this definition, are rejected 
because any such acknowledgement would weaken 
challenges to the present system. As with the previous 
understanding, to apply the PP is regarded as political, 
but less in the sense of being publicly accountable for 
risk-management judgements than in an instrumental 
sense. With regard to the distinction between science 
and politics, boundaries are weak but still exist. Sci-
ence is supposed to serve political aims and is empha-
sised if politically necessary. 
Policy implications 
The three interpretations manifest different concepts 
of the relationship between science and politics, 
whereby each understanding of the PP is an example 
rather than the cause. Thus the PP frames the rela-
tionship in different ways; in addition, different po-
litical value judgements are involved. 
For example, the first interpretation sees the Aus-
trian commitment to organic agriculture as scientifi-
cally untenable, in other words, organic farming 
would not have anything to do with ‘precaution’. 
The second understanding would conceptualise the 
benefit gained through both the use of less pesticides, 
and the socio-economic advantage of a niche-market 
saving farmers’ livelihoods. The final understanding 
would see organic farming as the only tenable alter-
native, to be pursued on a general level. Thus, the 
boundary between science and politics plays a role 
only in the first interpretation, whereas it has little 
relevance in the other two. 
The first and third understandings can be associ-
ated with established positions found elsewhere. 
Austria’s agri-biotechnology regulation 
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Scientists and industry representatives, on the one 
hand, and (environmental) NGO activists, on the 
other hand, often describe precaution in similar 
terms. The political–economic understanding ap-
pears more peculiar and resonates strongly with the 
official Austrian position, in the sense that science 
should be “on tap” rather than “on top” (Stirling, 
1999), without implying a weaker boundary between 
them. With this interpretation in mind, we now look 
at particular policy issues: risk-assessment strate-
gies, stances on the de facto moratorium and the is-
sue of GM-free areas. 
Risk assessment strategies 
From the very beginning of the debate on GM crops 
in Austria, officials advocated a broad concept of 
risk including the effects of agricultural practice. 
This could be interpreted as a shift in the boundary 
of a ‘scientific’ argument in risk assessment. In con-
trast, there was little risk research through scientific 
experimental releases. 
In the official argumentation against particular 
product approvals, uncertainties arising from such 
risk assessments played an important role. Thus 
Austrian authorities followed a different track from 
other member states in assessing risks that had been 
underestimated or that had not been evaluated rigor-
ously enough. In particular, Austria emphasised 
missing measurements of toxicological and aller-
genic effects especially of GM food products. 
As a more novel aspect, Austria considered local 
conditions that might be different from those in 
other places, and that might suggest different solu-
tions from an environmental point of view. Here, 
agricultural practice played a role as well; although 
the aim was to protect the environment, evaluations 
sometimes blurred the boundary between (what sci-
entists would call) scientific and societal aspects. 
Official risk assessors aimed to achieve an inte-
grated, contextual appraisal, taking into account as 
many parameters as possible. This was no deliberate 
attempt to simply blur the boundary between science 
and politics. However, the integrated approach had 
the (perhaps not unintended) effect that assessments 
became more complicated, to the extent that deci-
sions were made difficult if not impossible. This 
‘making things complicated’ by taking into account 
aspects that could be considered both a risk and a 
socio-economic argument might have been a strat-
egy to gain time or to preclude a pro-GM decision. 
The Bt 11 maize case provides an example of how 
different arguments were applied to justify a national 
stance that was politically ‘necessary’. Advocated by 
France under the Deliberate Release Directive, the 
application was criticised by several member states 
for its lack of detailed data, sloppy experimental de-
sign and the fact that it was submitted under the old 
regulatory framework. The Austrian position 
brought in additional dimensions: any GM prod- 
uct would have to wait until the problems of  
co-existence, cross-contamination and traceability 
could be solved at a European level. According to 
the Commission guidelines of July 2003, responsi-
bility for co-existence measures remains at a national 
level (CEC, 2003), so harmonisation of the pertinent 
issues was likely to take considerable time, not only 
for cultivation uses but also for novel food. 
Those advocating a “sound science” approach 
(Miller and Conko, 2001) often characterised such a 
position as being “unscientific”, but this would not 
explain its rationale. Rather, it can be understood as 
a strategy to spare science the burden of taking po-
litical responsibility. Most interviewees, including 
regulators, viewed ‘risk’ as a social (or political) 
construct in which the role of science is relegated to 
providing advice. 
The conceptualisation of science as advising but 
not determining decisions allows values to be in-
cluded separately, in an overall consideration of both 
values and scientific facts, as long as they are kept 
apart. In an idealised understanding, science thereby 
can remain value-free and untainted by politics. This 
view is important for the question as to whether or not 
there was a blurring of the boundary between science 
and politics. In the dominant political–economic un-
derstanding, the boundary was still intact. 
In fact, among institutional stakeholders and civil 
servants, risk assessment seemed to understand sci-
ence as entirely independent, though its results must 
be subject to political deliberations. Scientific uncer-
tainty is seen as inevitable and only to be managed 
through decisions that must be taken on a political 
basis, yet clearly indicated as such. Thus the Aus-
trian understanding was seen as compatible with the 
separation of risk assessment and management in the 
Commission communication on the PP (CEC, 2000). 
However, current EU regulation would not allow 
acknowledging political decision-making as being 
legitimate in such a case. This conflict was under-
stood as an inherent contradiction in the EU regula-
tory framework, rather than an oddity of the 
Austrian stance. 
Although the Austrian position seemed fairly 
unique, some aspects of the ‘political–economic’ un-
derstanding were also compatible with Commission 
Conceptualising science as advising 
but not determining decisions allows 
values to be included separately, in an 
overall consideration of both values 
and scientific facts, as long as they are 
kept apart: science thereby can 
remain value-free and untainted by 
politics 
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policy, given its functional separation between risk 
assessment and risk management. Although in prac-
tice the Commission often defers to official expert 
advice in the name of ‘science’, such a policy too 
implies a strategy to spare science the burden of tak-
ing political responsibility. 
Likewise, the PP is allocated to a management 
decision, distinct from its scientific grounds (CEC, 
2000). Thus, the Austrian ‘political–economic’ un-
derstanding of precaution could be seen as stretching 
the Commission’s understanding rather than funda-
mentally diverging from it. Indeed, the dominant 
understanding’s primary role was to interface with 
the EU regulatory system while reconciling it with 
political views among the Austrian public. 
However, differences existed. For example, the 
Commission communication takes it for granted that 
there are different severities of risk, but it leaves 
open what type of risk would warrant applying the 
PP, or what kind of unintended consequence would 
be deemed intolerable, for instance, to be called ‘se-
rious or irreversible harm’. In our workshops and 
interviews, emphasis was placed on general accounts 
of how to deal with any uncertainty about risks 
rather than on ranking risks that would be consid-
ered ‘serious’. 
The almost canonical list — of gene transfer, in-
creased weediness, harm to non-target organisms, 
health hazards, and so on — would certainly be 
deemed ‘serious’, though sometimes for different 
reasons. The differentiation among types of harm 
was not always clear; for example, gene transfer was 
conceptualised as both an environmental hazard and 
an economic threat. 
Often reference to ‘benefits’ appeared to be a way 
to avoid meticulous debates, obviously considered 
futile, about what risk would be severe enough to 
justify the application of the PP. Possible risks must 
be matched with ‘benefits’ — whatever they are and 
however they might be established. This was a 
prominent argument that recurred in different forms 
and gave rise to extended debates about ‘other le-
gitimate factors’. Thus, uncertainty about risk was 
no longer the decisive criterion, while uncertainty 
about benefit tended to take its place. In this way, 
and without seriously challenging the boundary be-
tween science and politics, Austrian procedures ef-
fectively reversed the burden of evidence. 
Interpretation of the de-facto moratorium 
By contrast to the Commission and some member 
countries that intended to lift the de facto morato-
rium, in summer 2003, Austria (together with other 
countries), officially proposed to maintain it. Thus 
the Austrian official position had not substantially 
changed since the late 1990s; on the contrary, a 
semi-official declaration in 2003 explicitly did not 
support the development and use of GM crops, at 
least for the foreseeable future. This position re-
flected a widespread consensus among the public, 
NGOs, policy-makers and the agro-food sector, 
which had profited from being able to deliver guar-
anteed GM-free products. 
The de facto moratorium was interpreted as a suc-
cess for the Austrian position. It was an attempt “not 
to take any decision in the light of public hostility”, 
as an interviewee from the Competent Authority 
stated, but also to gain more scientific insights, for 
example, ones that would support a more cautious 
approach to GMOs. Consequently, many policy ac-
tors considered the prolongation of the moratorium 
as desirable, for different reasons. 
The revised Deliberate Release Directive was 
equally seen as influenced by Austrian ideas; it did 
not automatically ensure that new GM products 
would gain market approval, since it provided new 
criteria that could be applied in order not to grant 
permission. However, interviewees were often  
uncertain about the role of the revised Directive vis-
à-vis other more ‘vertical’ regulation in force or 
pending, such as the GM Food and Feed Regulation, 
which they feared would marginalise environmental 
aspects and rather emphasise product properties. 
Nevertheless, marketing authorisations under  
the revised Directive would still allow farmers to 
grow GMOs everywhere in the EU, more or less 
irrespective of local conditions (unless explicitly 
declared). Another major problem for Austria  
was the pending loss of its reputation as a source  
of GM-free products, because of possible contami-
nation through gene flow. Thus the problem of con-
tamination, at least in the political–economic 
understanding, became inevitably linked to the  
future of organic agriculture, which fitted better  
with the widespread anti-GM attitude in Austria. 
This link had been involved, often in the form of a 
strategic argument along the lines of the normative 
understanding, in the debate about biotechnology 
from the beginning. In the context of the search  
for ‘benefits’, market success for non-GM crops 
clearly would count as a benefit, especially if they 
were derived from environmentally friendly organic 
agriculture. 
GM-free areas 
Developments in the EU triggered political activity 
both at federal and regional level. In July 2002, a 
Parliamentary petition demanded zero tolerance with 
respect to GMO contamination. One means of ensur-
ing the purity of organic and other GM-free produce 
was to establish identifiable, GM-free areas; hence, 
the petition proposed to declare the whole of Austria 
a ‘GM-free region’. Originally this idea had arisen 
from the debate on the first application for a GMO 
release, as a basis for objection. A newspaper had 
taken up the idea and popularised it during the cam-
paign for an anti-GM peoples’ petition in 1997. The 
idea caught on through its simplified redefinition by 
the media, appealing to the general public attitude of 
Austria being an island. 
Austria’s agri-biotechnology regulation 
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The debate about GM-free regions and/or co-
existence, together with the July 2003 Commission 
proposal, led to an unprecedented consensus be-
tween government and opposition to strive for a 
GM-free agriculture, even at a time when Austria 
had intense political conflicts in general. This con-
sensus was very popular but obviously politically 
unfeasible since it was at odds with EU policy, 
which would not permit national laws banning GM 
crops. 
Nevertheless, given the federal structure of agri-
cultural regulations, several regions had been dis-
cussing and preparing draft laws aiming to establish 
officially ‘GM-free areas’, irrespective of party  
differences. Initially, they had only been in the form 
of a political declaration, but legal provisions  
followed in 2003 in two regions, Upper Austria in 
the north and Carinthia in the south. 
The European Commission closely monitored lo-
cal developments that sought to restrict already-
approved products. While the Commission rejected 
the approach by Upper Austria to issue an outright if 
temporary ban on GMOs, Carinthia was successful 
with a more moderate solution of a ‘precaution law’. 
The law established bans in specially protected and 
ecologically sensitive areas such as nature reserves 
or Alpine regions. The law also required growers to 
apply for permission in advance to grow GM crops. 
It stipulated minimum safety distances between GM 
and non-GM crops to prevent gene flow, in a way 
that would make a GM-based agriculture difficult to 
impossible in the light of the small average size of 
Carinthian fields. 
The European Commission was suspicious about 
whether this amounted to a ban ‘through the back 
door’, so it demanded some amendments. For exam-
ple, the Commission restricted bans in ecologically 
sensitive and/or protected areas in order to maintain 
proportionality; a ban may only be issued if it is 
“also necessary for an authorisation on an EU-wide 
level”. The Commission in principle accepted the 
draft law in late 2003 and it was implemented in 
2004. Meanwhile, several other Austrian regions 
followed suit. 
Irrespective of some restrictions demanded, the 
Carinthian law set an EU-wide precedent, through 
political–administrative negotiation over stringent 
but flexible rules for co-existence. In addition, the 
possibility of setting up GM-free areas provided a 
reassuring rhetorical device. Problems remain, how-
ever, for example, in the definition and scope of 
what constitutes a GM-free area (whether it refers to 
the total absence of GMOs or relates to a certain 
species or product), of enforcement and of thresh-
olds (as they are still inevitable for laboratory con-
trols), and in the relationship between regions and 
the federal state in providing the infrastructure for 
controls. 
For the co-existence issue, the authorities suc-
ceeded in circumventing the problem of whether  
or not a particular argument against GMOs is  
‘scientific’. Austria had a vanguard position in de-
manding measures to safeguard co-existence — for 
obvious reasons, as it appeared. In this way, Aus-
trian regional authorities found solutions without 
having to defend themselves against attack for hav-
ing applied ‘unscientific’ arguments. The shift in 
boundaries associated with such a step, however, 
remained largely implicit. 
Conclusion 
According to Beck, as long as the political system 
could not accommodate precautionary demands for 
risk prevention, it would face protests from the po-
litical periphery (Beck et al, 2001). Demands to re-
verse the burden of evidence would come from the 
bottom-up and would undermine the centre of the 
political system. In the Austrian case, however, im-
petus to apply the PP came from the top down, as 
part of a long-standing policy. 
Precaution served to justify decisions rooted in 
the early days of biotechnology policy in Austria, 
influenced by largely consensual political considera-
tions about socio-economic benefits. This particular 
position led the Austrian Government to apply the 
PP, rather than take a deliberate step towards reflex-
ivity. Domestically, the Austrian CA was not forced 
to justify its judgements on scientific grounds, be-
cause it followed a popular, though tacit, political 
consensus on taking into account socio-economic 
benefits. However, in the EU, socio-economic ar-
guments were not considered a valid criterion for 
regulatory decisions. 
The Austrian stance reconciled seemingly mutually 
exclusive lines of argumentation, through a series of 
steps. First, the demand to take into account agricul-
tural practice challenged the position of laboratory 
science, in favour of alternative knowledge 
(Torgersen, 1996). Secondly, invoking the PP empha-
sised uncertainty instead of scientifically proven ef-
fects. A third step effectively reversed the burden of 
evidence. Formerly, benefit was taken for granted and 
the decisive question was about risk. In the Austrian 
policy, uncertainty over risk is taken for granted and 
the decisive question is uncertainty over benefit. 
All this was done without overtly shifting or  
challenging the boundary between science and poli-
tics, though their relative priority was reversed. The 
three understandings of precaution can illuminate that 
reversal. While science takes priority in the ‘scien-
tific’ understanding, it supports political decision-
making in the ‘political–economic’ understanding 
and is subject to strategic considerations in the ‘norm-
ative’ systems-critical understanding. The dominant 
‘political–economic’ understanding showed its  
practical impact in all three examples of GM-
political issues above. 
Invoking the PP appears, in retrospect, to be a ra-
tional means to gain room for manoeuvre in a politi-
cally difficult situation under a contested scientific 
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uncertainty. The Austrian stance has contributed 
policy elements compatible with a more ‘reflexive’ 
policy: comparative assessment of agricultural prac-
tices, long-term monitoring, and traceability includ-
ing labelling. There is indication of such institutional 
change beyond Austria, even if most EU member 
countries considered the Austrian application of the 
PP still inappropriate. 
Coming back to our theoretical point of departure, 
we can ask: what change occurred in the relationship 
between science and policy in this case? Boundaries 
between science and politics were blurred, though 
more implicitly in political practice than in the view 
of policy actors. For example, the relevant uncer-
tainty was reframed around benefit rather than risk. 
From an epistemic point of view, however, policy 
actors did not overtly shift or disagree about bounda-
ries between political versus scientific arguments. 
Rather, through the emphasis on uncertainty, politi-
cal (or socio-economic) arguments gained a similar 
importance to scientific arguments, with both re-
maining firmly within their semantic categories. 
Relevant actors seemed hardly aware of bound-
ary-blurring; neither did they embrace the notion of 
multiple boundaries being equally legitimate, nor 
that of reflexively steering the process. The Austrian 
policy thus can be interpreted as offering a prag-
matic means to gain room for manoeuvre, rather 
than as a coherent approach for a more reflexive way 
to deal with a controversial technology. 
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